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A Critical Assessment on the Extraterritorial




The issue of mass transnational cyber surveillance arises in a time when there
has been a clear trend of expanding the application of human rights treaties. So it
was not surprising that in the report on privacy in the digital age produced by the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [‘‘ECtHR”] in July 2014,
when addressing extraterritorial surveillance and interception of
communications, the report restated that ‘‘a State may not avoid its
international human rights obligations by taking action outside its territory
that it would be prohibited from taking ‘at home’”1 and that ‘‘[t]his holds
whether or not such an exercise of jurisdiction is lawful in the first place, or in
fact violates another State’s sovereignty.”2 The control standard to be applied to
cyber surveillance triggering jurisdiction given in this report3 may well be
controversial, but the trend recognizing extraterritorial application is certainly
clear. However, the report was silent on the substantive requirements to be
applied to transnational cyber surveillance. By addressing the scope of human
* Wanshu Cong is currently studying for her PhD at the Law Faculty of McGill
University, under Professor Frédéric Mégret’s supervision. Her thesis, entitled ’Human
Rights in the Digital Age: A Theory of A-Territorial Human Rights’, examines the
reconstruction of the spatial imaginaries of human rights by means of surveillance and
digital technologies used by states and individuals. She is an LLB graduate (2013) from
Shantou University, China and a LLM graduate of the Geneva Academy of
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (2014). Her research interests
include legal theories, history of international law, human rights law and global
governance.
1 Right to Privacy in A Digital Age: Report of the Office of the High Commissioner of
Human Rights, UNHRC, 27th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/27/37 (2014), at para 33
[OHCHR].
2 Ibid at para 34.
3 Ibid:
‘‘It follows that digital surveillance therefore may engage a State’s human rights obligations if
that surveillance involves the State’s exercise of power or effective control in relation to digital
communications infrastructure, wherever found, for example, through direct tapping or penetra-
tion of that infrastructure. Equally, where the State exercises regulatory jurisdiction over a third
party that physical controls the data, that State also would have obligations under the Covenant.
If a country seeks to assert jurisdiction over the data of private companies as a result of the in-
corporation those companies in that country, then human rights protections must be extended to
those whose privacy is being interfered with, whether in the country of incorporation or
beyond.”
rights protection in separate sections, i.e., the application of the law and the
substantive requirements of lawful interference on fundamental freedoms such as
the right to privacy, it seemed as if once the law was applicable, the requirements
applied to internal and foreign surveillance in the same way. And no distinction
between internal and foreign surveillance was made in its recommendation on
furthering the analysis on the principle of necessity, proportionality and
legitimacy in relation to surveillance practices.4
In this essay, I question the appropriateness of applying the substantive
requirements of lawful domestic surveillance developed from international
human rights treaties and relevant case law to transnational cyber surveillance.
And I argue in the negative. Therefore, for the purpose of this essay, I would not
delve into the highly debatable issue of what counts as ‘‘control” in cyber
surveillance and which standard of control triggers a state’s jurisdiction. Instead,
this essay assumes that a control test was established. In the following section, I
shall examine the substantive requirements for states restricting fundamental
freedoms drawn on from current human rights case law. And I shall demonstrate
why these tests, which are designed for internal surveillance, will be problematic
if applied to foreign cyber surveillance. My approach is territorial. And the core
of the problems, I argue, is that the legal and political implications of territory
and border, as currently understood, cannot provide a satisfying theoretical basis
for expanding states’ regulatory power extraterritorially. I understand that my
territorial approach may be considered very conservative, or Westphalian, and
therefore, I would address some potential responses to my arguments in the
conclusion.
I. APPLYING HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES TO TRANSNATIONAL
CYBER SURVEILLANCE
Requirements for lawful domestic surviellance are understood as the
conditions under which a state can lawfully restrict the right to privacy and
the freedom of expression which are among the fundamental freedoms of an
individual. These rights are not absolute as they allow certain limitation and
derogation by the state.5 A classic examination of the legality of limitation on
fundamental freedoms and the validity of derogation can be seen, for example,
from the Siracusa Principle on the Limitation and Derogation Provision in the
ICCPR.6 In the following analysis, I pick out three substantive requirements —
4 Ibid at para 51.
5 See e.g International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999
UNTS171, arts. 4, 17, 19 (entered into force 23March 1976) [ICCPR];Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS
221, arts 8, 10, 15 (entered into force 3September 1953) [ECHR];AmericanConvention on
HumanRights, 22November 1969, 1144UNTS 123, arts 11, 13, 27 (entered into force 18
July 1978).
6 The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International
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(i) being prescribed by the law; (ii) having legitimate purposes; and (iii)
proportionality — to demonstrate the difficulties in their extraterritorial
application.
(a) Being Prescribed by the law
The requirement of being prescribed by the law for lawful limitations means
that the law which serves the basis of limiting the fundamental freedoms should
be accessible to the public and produce foreseeable legal consequences. For a
territorial sovereign state, this requirement prohibits secret legislation which is
deemed as tyrannical and inconsistent with the rule of law and democratic
accountability.7 Publishing and distributing the law to the people is thus an
obligation of the state towards the general public. It is assumed that a properly
promulgated law satisfies the accessibility requirement. Adding up to the
requirement of accessibility is the qualitative requirement of foreseeability. The
law should not only be promulgated publicly, but its content should be
formulated with sufficient precision to allow people to regulate their behaviours.8
There is meanwhile a maxim that ignorance of the law by someone cannot excuse
his/her illegal conduct. Underlying this maxim and the requirement of
accessibility and foreseeability of the law is a reciprocal relationship between
the sovereign and its subjects. As state itself is territorial, such a reciprocal
relationship — the mutual obligations between states and people — is restricted
by territory. So for non-citizens, as long as they remain outside the territory of a
state, they do not owe obligations to obey the law of that state. But upon the
entry to a state by a foreigner, it is presumed that the foreigner is informed of the
local laws and is obliged to obey them.
This spatial presumption of accessibility and foreseeability of the law is
difficult to maintain in cyberspace where the conduct of individual may be
subject to multiple jurisdictions, depending on the route and destination of the
informational flow. And even the laws are published in most jurisdictions and
many states have official websites and databases dedicated to publishing
domestic legislations, it is not reasonable to assume that individuals will be able
to know all the laws of other countries which could be potentially applicable to
them.
Furthermore, in the situation of surveillance and espionage, it is not that
individuals actively contact a foreign state by actively circulating and making
materials accessible in that state, like what usually happen in defamation cases,9
Covenant onCivil andPolitical Rights,UNCommission onHumanRights, 41st Sess,UN
Doc E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex (1984).
7 Christopher Kutz, “Secret Law and the Value of Publicity” (2009) 22:2 Ratio Juris 197.
8 See e.g. Rotaru v Romania [GC], No 28341/95, [2000] V ECHR 192, 8 BHRC 449, at
para.52.
9 Uta Kohl, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Regulatory Competence over Online Activity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 111.
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but the opposite. More importantly, such contact is without the knowledge of the
impacted persons. Secrecy is the whole point of surveillance and espionage.
When a state carries out internal surveillance against its own people, publicity of
the surveillance law does not negate the secrecy of specific surveillance
operation.10 Therefore, in a domestic setting, there is no contradiction between
the accessibility requirement of the law and the nature of surveillance. However,
in the situation of transnational cyber surveillance, the secrecy of the surveillance
operation would mean that people are unable to tell not only whether they are
being spied, but also by whom they are being spied, needless to say the domestic
legal basis of the surveilling state for such surveillance operations. Currently,
there seems to be no satisfying solutions. Either states forgo the advantage of
secrecy of cyber surveillance, notify the non-citizens that they are being spied,
and so make the legal basis of surveillance accessible to them, and meanwhile try
not to reveal too much detail that would defeat the purpose of the whole
surveillance operation; or, the reciprocal relationship between the sovereign and
people needs to be reconceptualised in the cyberspace: the accessibility of a
state’s domestic law becomes universal and the publication of a state’s legislation
creates an obligation of everyone in the cyberspace to know about that
legislation. Except the case where two countries could achieve certain kinds of
understanding of mutual espionage (not necessarily using the word espionage or
surveillance), the first option is hardly a politically feasible one. And even where
two countries agreed on mutual espionage, like Australia and Indonesia did in
2014,11 there are more questions to be considered, such as the validity of this
kind of agreement under international law and the scope of domestic judicial
oversight on such mutual espionage. The second option is unreasonable because
it would expose individuals to the laws of all countries, and therefore lead to a
sheer imbalance between rights and obligations of individuals and states. In
short, the territorial limit presumed in the accessibility requirement of national
law cannot be reconciled with the extraterritorial human rights limitations
imposed through cross-border cyber surveillance programmes.
(b) Legitimate Purposes
The imposition of a lawful restriction on fundamental freedoms must pursue
legitimate purposes which are permitted by the human rights treaties. Taking it
together with the proportionality requirement discussed in the following
subsection, they are subsumed in the test of ‘‘democratic necessity”. While it
10 Malone v the United Kingdom (1984), 10 ECHR (Ser A), 7 EHRR 14, at para.67:
‘‘[T]he requirement of foreseeability cannot mean that an individual should be enabled to foresee
when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can adapt his conduct
accordingly. Nevertheless, the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an
adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conductions on which public
authorities are empowered to resort to this secret and potentially dangerous interference with the
right to respect for private life and correspondence.”
11 ‘‘Julie Bishop hails spying code of conduct with Indonesia”, The Guardian (28 August
2014), online: <www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/28/spying-code-of-conduct>.
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has been argued that the context of the measures taken (i.e. the legitimate
purpose, and the specific measures, which pertains to their proportionality)
cannot be analysed separately,12 I still divide my discussion into two parts
because the two requirements would have some distinct problems posed by
transnational cyber surveillance.
The legitimate purposes in the limitation clauses can be grouped into four
categories in general: security concerns; health and morals; economic well-being,
and the rights of other individuals.13 The lawfulness of derogations presumes the
existence of a state of emergency in which the state has to defend itself, and
therefore the purpose of derogation is close to the security concerns among the
legitimate purposes of lawful limitations. For the purpose of this paper, I treat
these requirements of limitation and derogation together under a general notion
of legitimate purpose.
Similar to the requirement of having a legal basis, there is a territorial
presumption within the notion of legitimate purpose. Despite various theoretical
accounts for this notion,14 legitimate purpose is still largely a self-judging and
self-imposing notion.15 To be specific, a state or a community determines by
itself its own public purposes and takes regulatory measures on its subjects in
pursuing the purposes. And the legitimacy of a particular public purpose means
the purpose is legitimate to the members of the political community. Currently,
international human rights law does not justify or account for a state taking
measures vis-à-vis non-citizens outside its own territory for the self-judging
public purposes.16 Such unilateral exercise of sovereign power will be simply
against the principle of sovereign equality and non-intervention. The general
prohibition of unilateralism sets the territorial limit to the legitimacy of public
purpose and the measures pursuing it.
The self-judging and self-imposing character of the notion of legitimate
purpose cannot be easily reconciled with states’ transnational activities
12 Scott Sheeran, “Reconceptualizing States of Emergency under International Human
Rights Law: Theory, Legal Doctrine, and Politics” (2013) 34:3 Mich J Intl L 491.
13 See e.g ECHR, supra note 5 art 8(2).
14 See e.g. Aileen McHarg, “Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest:
Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights” (1999) 62:5 Mod L Rev 671.
15 Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga and C. Ryan Reetz, Public Purpose in International Law:
Rethinking Regulatory Sovereignty in the Global Era (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2015) at 206.
16 There are some arguments in favour of extraterritorial derogation from human rights
treaties, see e.g. Marko Milanovic, ‘‘Extraterritorial Derogations from Human Rights
Treaties in Armed Conflict” in N Bhuta, ed., The Frontiers of Human Rights:
Extraterritoriality and Its Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 55;
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016) at 216. However, the support from case law and state
practice is scant.Andas I shall argue below, the extraterritorial derogation suffers froma
more serious problem of democratic legitimacy.
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restricting human rights. The only exception is the case of military occupation,
where a special regime of international humanitarian law expressly provides for
the obligation of the occupying power to ensure the security of the population in
the occupied territory.17 For transnational cyber surveillance, we need to ask
how the public purpose, assuming it is legitimate for one state’s own people, can
be equally legitimate for citizens of other states who are the targets of
surveillance. If the legitimate purpose remains to be an effective requirement, do
we need to reconceptualise this notion as referring to, say, public purpose that is
legitimate for everyone who may be subject to surveillance? If that was the case,
the appreciation of legitimate purpose could no longer be self-judging anymore,
because cross-border legitimacy means there needs to be some objective criteria
for the determination of legitimate purpose. Accordingly, human rights tribunals
may not be able to enjoy the benefit of margin of appreciation as much as they
do now.18 But even with some objective criteria either developed by human rights
treaty bodies19 or recognised by multiple states, there remains a huge leap toward
subjecting non-citizens abroad to a state’s surveillance which pursues an
objectively established legitimate purpose of this state.
The notion of legitimate purpose necessarily limits the territorial scope of
human rights restrictions as the purpose and the restrictions need to answer to
the ‘‘public”. It will be a common challenge for any transnational measures
limiting fundamental freedoms of individuals. But for bulk cyber surveillance in
particular, there is an additional problem for the requirement of public interest.
The bulk surveillance, relying on the technology of big data and aiming at pre-
emption, fundamentally changes the way of conducting intelligence. Massive
amount of data is collected first, and data analysis and pattern recognition are
conducted afterwards.20 And only after the data collection and analysis, it may
become clear whether there is a concern of, for example, national security.21 In
other words, in bulk cyber surveillance, human rights are restricted even before a
legitimate purpose is identified, which goes against the rationale of permitting
17 See e.g.Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar,
12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 art. 49 (entered into force 21 October 1950) [Fourth
Geneva Convention].
18 See Sheeran, supra note 12.
19 TheEuropeanCommission onHumanRights indeed drewon some objective criteria for
thedeterminationof state of emergency in theGreek case,Thlimmenos v.Greece, see infra
note 24. However, treaty bodies have been deferring to states’ own factual assessment
and avoiding the issue by analysing the proportionality of derogatory measures.
20 Bart van der Sloot, “How toAssess PrivacyViolations in theAge ofBigData?Analysing
the Three Different Tests Developed by the ECtHR and Adding for a Fourth One”
(2015) 24:1 Inf & Comm Tech L 74.
21 And it may well be the case where the authorities do not know what to do with the
massive amount of data simply because there is too much of it. See e.g. Alan Travis &
Own Bowcott ‘‘‘Snooper’s Charter’ will Cost British Lives, MPs are Warned”, The
Guardian (6 January 2016), online: <www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/06/snoo-
pers-charter-will-cost-british-lives-mps-warned>.
60 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [15 C.J.L.T.]
limitations on human rights. And as we will see, without identifying a specific
legitimate purpose, it will lead to serious problems with the requirement of
proportionality.
(c) Proportionality
(i) Proportionality of Surveillance
Proportionality has been a major point of criticisms on states’ surveillance
measures. To a certain degree, focusing on the issue of proportionality seems to
be a smart attempt to escape the highly political debate on the legality of
surveillance, because our phrasing of proportionality in terms such as balancing
appears to suggest that proportionality assessment can be done simply
technically. Such an approach, usually taken by human rights treaty bodies, is
severely criticised by Tsakyrakis as ‘‘pervert[ing] rather than elucidate[ing]
human rights adjudication”,22 because under the guise of balancing, the truly
difficult moral judgments of what is right and what is wrong are avoided, and
with this guise, we simply forget that sometimes there is no balance to be struck
in the first place. If there is no legitimate purpose, a measure cannot be lawful no
matter how proportionate it is designed. So even if a transnational cyber
surveillance programme is designed to be targeted and smart, there remains the
hard question whether surveillance has a legitimate purpose and how
international law deems a purpose of surveillance legitimate.
Even when we focus on the proportionality test, it turns out that a neutral
and technical proportionality assessment is a myth. Proportionality assessment is
full of value judgments, and the severity of an interference largely depends on the
importance attached to the right.23 Besides, proportionality and legitimacy of the
purpose of the disputed measure have a more nuanced relation. In a classic
assessment of the legality of limitations, the issue of legitimate purpose comes
before the assessment of proportionality, as mentioned above. So usually if the
disputed measure is not taken for a legitimate purpose, there is no need to
proceed on proportionality any more. However, as the ECtHR has held, a
disproportionate measure would illegitimize the purpose of the disputed
measure.24 This suggests that proportionality is not only a constituent part for
assessing the legality of limitation, but also a check on the alleged legitimate
purpose. And for the issue of cyber surveillance, such an interplay warns us that
the legitimacy of the purpose of cyber surveillance claimed by the states cannot
be taken at face value, because disproportionality could refute the presumption
of legitimacy.
22 Stavros Tsakyrakis, “Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights? ” (2009) 7:3 Intl J
Constitutional L 468, at 487.
23 Andrew Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law:
Deference and Proportionality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), at 184.
24 Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], No 34369/97, [2000] IV ECHR 263, 31 EHRR 15, para.47.
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While state practice remains quite ambiguous,25 there is a growing consensus
at the international level and European regional level on the disproportionality
of mass or bulk surveillance programmes.26 This recognition of
disproportionality will incentivise states to design their surveillance programme
in a more self-restraining way. But proportionality remains problematic even the
state conducting surveillance with sufficient self-restraint. In the following part
of this subsection, I shall discuss the quandary of democratic legitimacy of
proportionality in its extraterritorial application, which I believe cannot be
resolved simply by heightening the scrutiny in its application.
(ii) Extraterritoriality and Democratic Legitimacy
As noted earlier, proportionality is part of the test of ‘‘democratic necessity”.
As the other part of the test, i.e. legitimate purpose, is territorially limited, this
territorial limitation naturally applies to the requirement of proportionality. It
means that the elements for assessing the proportionality of a regulatory act by
the state are inherently confined to a democratic society. This territorial scope of
proportionality is supported by the doctrine of margin of appreciation. The close
relation between these two doctrines, described by Andrew Legg, is that the
margin of appreciation serves as an external factor which is considered along
with the internal factor — the nature of the rights — in the assessment of
proportionality.27 The doctrine of margin of appreciation is a judicial
construction by the human rights bodies which gives deference to individual
states when the judicial body feels incompetent to make a decision. The feeling of
incompetence of the judicial body may come from the perception that a state’s
decision enjoys democratic legitimacy,28 the recognition of the plurality of state
practice or the expertise of states pertaining to a disputed issue.29 The metaphor
of ‘‘margin”, taken literally, suggests the spatial scope within which the state can
exercise regulatory sovereignty.
A quick overview of the current jurisprudence of human rights bodies shows
that the test of proportionality has so far been considered largely in cases of
domestic limitations or derogations. Its use in dealing with extraterritorial
matters has been limited,30 with only the exceptional situations of extraterritorial
25 Even some states which are usually believed as human rights model countries, such as
Netherlands, Denmark, France, Switzerland, have either adopted or been considering
about the adoption of laws authorizing bulk interception of communications.
26 OHCHR, supra note 1; Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, C-362/14, [2015],
online: .
27 Legg, supra note 23, at 198.
28 But it will be an ironic if an international tribunal defers to a state due to the
consideration of democratic legitimacy when the state does not have such democratic
legitimacy to take measures on non-citizens abroad.
29 Legg, supra note 23, at 70-174.
30 It is especially so at the ECtHR. Several reasons contributed to the limited consideration
on the issue of proportionality. Firstly, a great amount of attention was paid to the
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use of force31 and military occupation.32 In both these situations, discussions
have largely been focused on the relation, and indeed the reconciliation, between
international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law
(IHL). And it has been argued convincingly by Aeyal Gross that a reconciliation
between the two branches of law would conflate two different proportionality
requirements.33 Proportionality under IHRL and IHL has completely different
applications. The reason lies in their distinctive rationales: for IHRL, balance (or
calculation) is conducted by assuming individuals as equal subjects of the state;
such equal footing does not exist for IHL which explicitly characterizes people,
properties and objects into different categories and differs the protection
accordingly.34 Local people living in the occupied territory are ‘‘protected
persons” while settlers of the occupying power are not.35 The protection of
settlers of the occupying power will not come into play in the calculation of
proportionality of measures, for example, destroying the properties of ‘‘protected
persons” under IHL.36 The result of applying proportionality test in IHRL to an
occupation scenario is that the protected persons in the occupied territory are
considered to be on an equal footing with people of the occupying power (both
problem of jurisdiction, and the merits were less discussed. Secondly, sometimes,
proportionalitywas avoided by theCourt finding that a limitation imposed by a state did
not have a legitimate aim. See e.g. Catan and Others v. The Republic of Moldova and
Russia [GC], Nos 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, [2012] V ECHR 309, 57 EHRR 4.
Thirdly, in some cases concerning armed conflicts, the Court was applying the necessity
and proportionality tests in IHL. See e.g. Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom [GC], No
27021/08 [2011] IV ECHR 305, 53 EHRR 23. Fourthly, the violation of human rights in
extraterritorial settings was claimed and found with respect to a state’s positive
obligation such as the obligation to investigate the killing of an individual. So the
proportionality of a limitation imposed by a state, which pertains to a state’s negative
obligation, was not litigated. See e.g. Jaloud v. The Netherlands, No 47708/08 [2014]
ECHR 1292.
31 Use of lethal force, see Pisari v The Republic ofMoldova and Russia, No 42139/12 [2015]
ECHR403. The ECtHR found that there was available alternativemeans to stop the car
without recourse to lethal force, and so the killing of Pisari was not absolutely necessary
for the purpose of effecting a lawful arrest.
32 See e.g.Beit SourikVillageCouncil v. TheGovernment of Israel [et al.] (2004),HCJ 2056/
04 (Israel); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] ICJ Rep 136.
33 Aeyal M. Gross, “Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the Emperor’s New Clothes
of the International Law of Occupation?” (2007) 18:1 Eur J Intl L 1; Martti
Koskenniemi, “Occupied Zone - ‘A Zone of Reasonableness’?” (2008) 41 Israel LR 13.
34 Gross, supra note 33 at 5.
35 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 17 arts 4, 49(5).
36 Typical proportionality test in IHL to be applied to occupied territories includes
‘‘absolutely necessary” for the security of the detaining power in article 42 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, ‘‘absolutely necessary by military operations” in article 53 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, ‘‘necessary for imperative reasons of security” in article 78 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention: supra note 17.
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living within the territory of the occupying power and settling in the occupied
territories). And the rights of the protected persons, which IHL exactly seeks to
protect, become vulnerable to the trade-off for the rights of non-protected
persons.37 By conducting such a proportionality test, the military commander
acts as if he was a proper sovereign. Ironically, a well-intentioned IHRL talk of
proportionality has rather perpetuated and institutionalised the unlawful
occupation.
This kind of worry is not absent in our case of transnational cyber espionage.
In peacetime, although there is no category similar to ‘‘protected person” in IHL,
treating foreigners abroad as subjects of a state’s managerial power on an equal
plane with people within the state’s own territory will encounter difficulties. Two
propositions seem to justify such equal footing. First is the principle of non-
discrimination in human rights law.38 Citizenship is one of the prohibited
grounds of discrimination in most human rights treaties.39 However, I argue that
this principle ensures same treatment to everyone within the formal jurisdiction
of a state. As a matter of fact, for people living in a state’s extraterritorial
jurisdiction, different treatment is rather accepted. In the occupation cases
discussed above, treatment will be indeed discriminatory in the sense that
‘‘protected persons” need to be especially taken care of under IHL, and this
discriminatory treatment is an outright recognition of the lack of democratic
legitimacy of the occupying power. In other situations of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, states’ obligations are also differentiated based on the actual
power and the legitimacy of the power. For example, when a state, through its
control of a transnational corporation, owes human rights obligations towards
local people of another state, the scope of the negative and positive obligations of
the state depends on the extent of its power which will affect the local people.40
The difference between the extraterritorial power and domestic sovereign
authority means that the obligations owed by the state towards people within
and without its territory are materially different. It means that even the case is
not occupation where ‘‘protected persons” need special protection, there lacks a
theoretical basis to treat people within a state’s territory and non-citizens abroad
as equal parties and equal subjects of the regulatory power of a sovereign state.
Furthermore, even if the principle of non-discrimination requires factually equal
treatment, such a requirement would be based precisely on a recognition that the
formal statuses of nationals and foreigners are different. It is this recognition that
37 Gross, supra note 33; Koskenniemi, supra note 33.
38 Marko Milanovic, “Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the
Digital Age” (2015) 56:1 Harv Intl LJ 81, at 98.
39 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.31: Nature of the General Legal
Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, UNDoc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, May
26 2004 at para.10.
40 Robert McGorquodale & Penelope Simons, “Responsibility beyond Borders: State
Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human
Rights Law” (2007) 70:4 Mod L Rev 598.
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leads to a restriction on what can legally be done to foreigners by the sovereign
state,41 and it leads to categories such as ‘‘national treatment”, ‘‘the most
favourable nation treatment”, etc. In short, the principle of non-discrimination
does not result in the equal formal status between citizens and non-citizens within
and without the state’s territory. And it means that non-citizens outside a state’s
territory cannot be legitimately presumed as its subjects when a state conducts
the proportionality test.
The other propositions supporting equal footings of people within a state
and foreigners abroad will be the idea that states are joint trustees of humanity.42
Such a cosmopolitan view considers states exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction
as surrogate trustees of the local people, and it requires that everyone who is
factually subject to the regulatory power of a state should be protected equally.
And this claim also supports the obligation of a state toward foreigners is
context-based.43 This claim of joint trustees of humanity indeed provides a useful
account for states undertaking extraterritorial human rights obligations. But
such an abstract and indeed aspirational account does not necessarily lead to
equal status between nationals and foreigners. The occupying power would be a
proper ‘‘surrogate trustee”, and the relation with the ‘‘protected persons” in the
occupied territories is fundamentally different from its relation with its own
people. More importantly, this account of joint trustees of humanity, as well as
the non-discrimination proposition, needs to be aware that blurring the formal
distinction of people may sanction the expansion of the regulatory power of a
state to those non-citizens who see the restrictions on their human rights have no
legitimacy in the first place.
That being said, one of the difficulties in applying the proportionality test
extraterritorially is that we do not have a satisfying theoretical basis for treating
the non-citizens abroad and the people within the state’s own territory as equal
subjects of the unilateral regulatory power of a sovereign state.
II. CONCLUSIONS
In the above sections, I have identified the problems in applying the tests for
lawful limitation on fundamental freedoms to transnational cyber surveillance.
The core of those problems is that the territoriality of sovereign state is not only
geographical. Territoriality has significant legal and political implications in the
sense that the democratic legitimacy of a state’s regulatory power is always
41 How to treat foreigners can be seen as ‘‘justice sensitive externalities”, a term used by
Mattias Kumm, which sovereign states have no legitimate authority to address
unilaterally: Mattias Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An
Integrated Conception of Public Law” (2013) 20:2 Ind J Global Leg Stud 605.
42 Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Fiduciaries of Humanity: How International Law
Constitutes Authority (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Eyal Benvenisti,
“Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign
Stakeholders” (2013) 107:2 AJIL 295.
43 Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 42 at 192-198.
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territorially limited. For transnational cyber surveillance, I argue that any call for
extraterritorial application of human rights law needs to be aware of the
territorial limit of democratic legitimacy as currently understood. A territorial
perspective of my argument may appear to be outdated since focusing on
territoriality is just the remnant of the old fashioned Westphalia dogma and
appears to be antithetical to the universalist vision of human rights.44 It is my
opinion that as long as sovereign state remains to be the default political form,
territories and borders necessarily have certain political and moral implications
on individuals’ relation with states. To be sure, the human rights of individuals
are beyond territories of sovereign states. However, the substance of the rights,
which are affected by how states can legitimately exercise regulatory sovereign
power, is territorially contingent.
While it is not my intention to be against extraterritorial application of
human rights treaties, I understand that a possible criticism on my argument
would be that I am using my assessment on the substantive requirements against
the idea of extraterritorial application. So this possible criticism may argue that I
confound the merits and applicability issues. I wish to respond to this potential
criticism in the final conclusion.
The claim that my argument tends to confound the merits and applicability
issues presumes that the two issues can be clearly separated conceptually. And so,
logically, the merits issues only come after the admission that human rights law
indeed applies extraterritorially to states’ foreign cyber surveillance. The
applicability-merits separation also implies that the two issues would address
different problems. So, for the applicability of human rights law outside a state’s
territory, a major assessment is when a state has reached sufficient degree of
control to trigger its jurisdiction under human rights law, whereas how such
control interferes with or violates what human rights are issues of merits.
This separation, which appears to be valid in judicial reasoning, does not
necessarily mean that applicability is free from the impact of the problems in the
merits issue. As discussed above, democratic legitimacy is a major problem in the
substantive requirements of limitation on fundamental freedom in transnational
cyber surveillance. If we understood democratic legitimacy from a traditional
territorial perspective, there is no satisfying explanation for a state unilaterally
exercising regulatory sovereign power on non-citizens outside its territory,
whether in claiming legitimate public purposes, or conducting the
proportionality assessment, or expanding the accessibility of its domestic law
universally. Without a re-conceptualization of democratic legitimacy, merely
accepting the extraterritorial application of human rights law can be politically
unappealing. Especially in peacetime cyber surveillance between effective
sovereigns, the state which is surveilled may also object the argument of
extraterritorial application of human rights law because the argument opens the
door to unilateralism and may lead to an ironic justification for the violation of
44 Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law,
Principles, and Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 80.
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the sovereignty of the state being surveilled. In this sense, to argue for
extraterritorial application of human rights law not only tends to avoid the hard
question that whether cyber surveillance is lawful under international law, but
could also create a situation which regulates and institutionalizes potential
violation of sovereign equality by cyber surveillance.
More importantly, I argue that the claim about the applicability of the law
cannot be made without understanding how the law is going to be applied. When
we speak about extraterritorial application of human rights law, we mean the
whole body of human rights law, not only the negative obligations of states. So
to expand the application of human rights law means also to expand states’
regulatory power outside their borders. Sovereign states still enjoy a great deal of
leeway in the interpretation of human rights law, and especially for those non-
absolute rights which are highly relevant in cyber surveillance. Just like the
doctrines of proportionality and margin of appreciation, which are judicial
constructions not necessarily resulting in more protection of human rights,
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties is not a promise for more
protection either. So the claim for extraterritorial application of human rights
law, should it have any normative significance as we hope, need to be combined
with the understanding of merits issues. Otherwise, the claim of extraterritorial
application of human rights law could become a rhetoric game of states, each
paying lip services and accepting the claim without good faith. It will undermine
the integrity of the human rights regime, despite our good intention in arguing
for the expansion of the application of human rights law. Therefore, I believe
that a holistic approach is more desirable.
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Do They Want to Regulate Online Profiling?
Laura Garcia Vargas*
‘‘Bottom line: More personal information, more money. It is a valid business
model, the one that gives us, in return, access to Internet largely free of
monetary charges. But it is a tricky one: personal information becomes not
only a currency but the currency. The entire business model rests upon the
amount and precision of personal information collected.”1
Abstract
Online profiling or behavioural tracking is the process by which private
companies track and gather data about users’ activities in online platforms. The
data collected by all the companies is aggregated with the purpose of creating a
comprehensive profile about users. Since at least 15 years ago, there have been
several attempts to regulate online profiling in order to reduce its privacy
implications. In general, these regulations have tried to limit the way the
information is used, the type of data that is collected, and impose or suggest the
security standards that the companies should take to protect it.
This article will demonstrate that the proposed regulations do not reduce online
profiling’s privacy repercussions. In addition, it will argue that in order to reduce
privacy repercussions it is necessary to regulate the aggregation and
commercialization of the data. However, governments, industries, and users may
not have enough incentives to find alternative methods or effective regulations to
address the problems raised by online profiling.
INTRODUCTION
The tracking of individuals’ activities is an old practice. Even before the
digital era, companies tracked their customers to understand and analyze their
behaviour in order to design better marketing campaigns. With the invention of
the computer, and later the internet, it became easier to track customers, to keep
a record of the tracking, and to analyze the data. Moreover, it became possible
and easy to share the data with other companies in order to understand better the
behaviour of a particular individual.
Due to new technologies, an old practice used by companies to improve their
marketing campaigns, now is the one of the major sources of personal data
collection and creation of databases. As technology advances, not only does the
* PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa
1 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Speech: Online Behavioural Advertis-
ing –Putting aNormativeFrameworkAroundaBusinessModel – January 21, 2014” (10
March 2014), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/media/sp-d/2014/sp-d_20140121_cb_e.asp>.
tracking become easier, but the information collected by companies becomes
more precise and more revealing of the private life of the tracked customer.
Right now there is an industry around personal information. There are
hundreds of companies making profits from the personal information of online
platforms users. For some of the companies the business is to track users across
different platforms, for others is to facilitate the aggregation, and for others is to
gain some type of advantage by using that information. The tracking of the
online behaviour of the users of online platforms is called online profiling or
behavioural tracking.2
This paper will explain the practice of online profiling by dividing it in five
stages: (1) installation of the technology, (2) tracking of the users, (3) collection
of the data in private databases, (4) aggregation of the data, and (5) use of the
profiles created after the aggregation of the data. Graphic 1 illustrates these
stages and highlights some of the problems that arise in each of them.
Online profiling arise several privacy implications for the personal
information of the online platform users. Policy makers in the United States,
Canada, and the European Union have attempted to regulate this practice to
reduce the threat to privacy that it represents. Nevertheless, these attempts of
regulation have not been successful. The main problem that policy makers have
identified is the lack of transparency and users’ knowledge with which this
practice occurs. Consequently, most of the proposed regulations have focused in
making the practice more transparent, informing the users, and asking for the
users’ consent. Nevertheless, the biggest threat to privacy and the real value of
the practice is in the aggregation of the data. Nonetheless, policy makers have
not defined the aggregation as the focus of the problem, and the solutions
proposed do not affect this stage.
This article will argue two main points. First, in order to reduce the privacy
repercussion created by online profiling it is necessary to directly regulate the
aggregation and commercialization of the data. Second, the data collected and
aggregated represent important benefits to all stakeholders, for this reason there
are no incentives to regulate online profiling in order to reduce its real threat to
privacy.
This paper will have four sections. Section I will expose the stakeholders
involved, and the benefits of the practice. Section II will explain each of the five
2 For the purpose of this paper, online platforms refer to computer browsers,
smartphones, tablets, or any device used to connect to the internet.
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stages of online profiling, the problems that arise in each of them and the
solution proposed to regulate those problem. Section III will argue that to really
protect the online platforms users’ from privacy threats it is necessary to redefine
what is the problem of online profiling. Section IV will analyze if the
government, the industry and the users have any incentive to regulate the
online profiling practice.
I. ONLINE PROFILING: HOW IT WORKS
By monitoring online behaviour over time, companies collect enough
information about an individual (or a specific device) to create a unique digital
profile. The creation of comprehensive personal profiles is the main justification
of online profiling. In this process, some actors gather the data, others aggregate
it, and finally someone buys it mainly for marketing. As Deibert argues:
‘‘companies of all shapes and sizes systematically pick through our digital
droppings, collating them, passing them around, inspecting them, and feeding
them back to us. And this market shows no sign of slowing.”3 This section will
analyze who are the main stakeholders and what are the benefits of online
profiling.
In the online environment, there are different technologies that enable a
communication between the users’ devices and tracking companies. Due to this
communication first- and third-party companies can follow the user within and
between online platforms and/or different physical locations. Depending on the
technology used, the company is able to gather different types of information
about a user or device.4 This information might be associated to a specific device
or to the identity of an individual. The data that each of the technologies gathers
alone may not represent a big threat to privacy, however the information from
several of these technologies creates the possibility of producing a very
comprehensive profile.
Different organizations participate in the tracking, collection, aggregation
and use of the users’ information. Based on the interaction with the users, it is
possible to divide them in two categories: first and third party.5 The first-party
organizations interact directly with users, because they own the apps and service
that the user accesses (e.g. retail and content sites, search engines, third-party
payment services, social networks, and weather apps). They have a contractual
3 Ronald J Deibert, Black Code. Surveillance, Privacy, and the Dark Side of the Internet,
Trade paperback ed. (Toronto, Ontario: McClelland & Steward, 2013) at 56.
4 See e.g. Officer of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Report on the 2010 Office of
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Consultation on Online Tracking, Profiling and
Targeting, and Cloud Computing”, (May 2011), online:<www.priv.gc.ca/media/1961/
report_201105_e.pdf > at 12.
5 See e.g. Tracy A. Steindel, ‘‘Path toward User Control of Online Profiling” (2011) 17:2
Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 459 at 465.
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relation with the user based on the Terms of Use and the Privacy Policy of the
company.6
On the other hand, the third-party organizations lack a consumer interface,
however they have access to the users’ online data. Some of these companies
track the users; others aggregate, analyze, sell, or buy the users’ data (e.g. agency
trading desks, data suppliers, ad networks, banks, governments, law
enforcement, and lawyers).7
Online profiling has benefits for users and companies.8 For example,
targeting advertising supports ‘‘free” (or low monetary cost) access to online
services and content.9 In addition, the tracking and the information collected
help to improve the commercial relation between users and companies. For
instance, it improves the user experience by making the experience more
personalized by showing relevant search results based on the web history of the
user, and displaying advertising based on frequently visited sites and geo-
location;10 improves the quality of the services of the company and helps with
developing new products; 11 secures and protects the users’ personal accounts, by
letting the company know if someone different from the account owner tries to
access the account.12
Furthermore, it has marketing benefits for the companies as it enables
companies to classify the individuals into groups based on specific
characteristics. This classification is useful because it allows audience targeting
which facilitates specific and more efficient marketing actions. 13
6 The Privacy Policy stipulates how the companywill manage the information they collect
from the user. For example, what information they collect and why they collect it, how
they use that information, and how to access and update the personal information. See
for example Google, ‘‘Google Privacy Policy”, (20 December 2013), Google Policies &
Principles, online: <www.google.ca/intl/en/policies/privacy/>.
7 See e.g. Julia Angwin, ‘‘TheWeb’s New GoldMine: Your Secrets”,Wall Street Journal
( 3 0 J u l y 2 0 1 0 ) , o n l i n e : < w w w . w s j . c o m / n e w s / a r t i c l e s /
SB10001424052748703940904575395073512989404>.
8 Recent events as the Snowden revelations show that it might have some benefits for the
government as well.
9 See e.g. Grand Gross, ‘‘Survey: Internet users like targeted ads, free content”,
Computerworld (19 April 2013), online: <www.computerworld.com/s/article/
9238549/Survey_Internet_users_like_targeted_ads_free_content?pageNumber=1>.
10 See for example Google, ‘‘Ads You’ll FindaMost Useful”, online: <www.google.com/
intl/en/policies/privacy/example/ads-youll-find-most-useful.html>.
11 See e.g. Google, ‘‘Develop New Ones”, online: <www.google.com/intl/en/policies/
privacy/example/develop-new-ones.html>.
12 See for example ‘‘Cookies, Pixels & Similar Technologies”, online: <www.facebook.-
com/help/cookies/?ref=sitefooter>;See alsoGoogle, ‘‘ProtectGoogle andOurUsers”,
online: <www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/example/protect-google-and-our-
users.html>.
13 See e.g. Daniel J Solove, ‘‘Privacy and Power: Computer Databases andMetaphors for
Information Privacy” (2001) 53:6 Stan L Rev 1393 at 1405.
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II. STAGES, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
As shown in Graphic 1 at the beginning of this paper, the online profiling
process is divided in five stages. This section will briefly explain each of the
stages. Then it will highlight some of the problems that arise in each of them.
Finally, it will expose some of the solutions proposed by policy makers in order
to mitigate the threat to privacy.14 Specifically, this section will focus on three
concerns: the knowledge and consent of the user, the type of information
collected, and the security measures to store and share the data. The aim of this
section is to give a general panorama; it does not aim to give an extensive report
about current problems and proposed solutions.
(a) Installation of the Technology
In this stage, companies install one or several of the available tracking
technologies in the user’s device.15 The moment when this occurs varies; it can be
as soon as the person opens a website, when the app is installed or when the
device is fabricated (e.g. cookies, web beacons, and GPS).
Other technologies such as IP address, Unique Device Identifier, or browsing
fingerprinting do not need previous installation. In these cases, the architecture
of the online platform or the device allows the tracking of the user without
installing an extra technology on the device.16 For example, every time a
computer is connected to a website its IP address is retrieved.17 In this stage, the
two main problems regarding privacy are: the user does not about the existence,
installation, and use of the technologies; and the lack and/or the validity of the
consent given by the user regarding the installation of those technologies.
Three of the main proposed solutions are: (1) companies must inform the
users about the installation and use of technologies and ask for their consent; (2)
companies must give the user an option to opt-out; and (3) the creation of a Do
Not Track mechanism. The main problem of those solutions is that even if
companies are transparent and inform the user about the use of the technologies
and the collection of the data, the user will never have the knowledge and tools
necessary to make an informed decision.18
14 This includes mainly policy makers from United States, Canada, and the European
Union. The paper will not focus on any specific proposal as the different jurisdictions
have approach the problem with the same or similar solutions.
15 Device includes web browsers, computer hard drives, smartphones, tablets, etc.
16 Here architecture is use Lessig’s definition: ‘‘The software and hardware that make
cyberspace what it is constitute a set of constraints on how you can behave. . .. They
constrain some behavior by making other behavior possible or impossible. The code
embeds certain values or makes certain values impossible.” Lawrence Lessig, Code 2.0
(New York, United States of America: Basic Books) at 124–125.
17 See e.g. Mozilla, ‘‘Privacy on the Internet”, online: <www.mozilla.org/projects/
security/pki/psm/help_21/privacy_help.html>.
18 Moreover, when the companies are transparent they only inform the user about a small
part of the technologies: cookies, web beacons, and GPS.
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Due to the aggregation of the data that companies do, the user will not be
able to foresee what the data collected by that particular company would truly
reveal. The data collected often has other uses besides the initial uses described
by the Privacy Policy. This data might have secondary uses by first-party
organization, or by third-party organizations (or individuals). 19 Even if some of
the potential uses are explain to the user, not all are foreseeable by the user when
he is giving his consent. In other words, when the user is giving his consent, he
cannot really valorize what he is giving away or what he is authorizing. 20
(b) Tracking
In this stage, companies follow the user’s online activities and keep a record
of that data. As previously explained, the data that companies can collect
include: what did the user see, for how long, her search queries, information
provided to the website, and her geo-location, among others. In this stage, the
main concerns are: the places where these technologies can follow the users, and
that the type of information collected constitutes personally identifiable
information (PII).21
Technologies can follow the user through different online sites and physical
places. Regarding online sites, the user is followed within each website he or she
visits, and through different website he or she browses. Apropos the physical
places, with the invention of GPS technology, and its installation in personal
devices such as mobile phones, automobiles, and cameras, it became easier to
collect data regarding the actual geo-location of the user.22
The main solution regarding the type of information collected has been to
limit the collection of data only to non-PII.23 The first problem of this solution is
the definition of what is personal information. The question about what
information to protect against a privacy invasion does not have a unique
answer.24 Therefore, achieving a consensus about this category is the first
challenge.
19 In addition, only first party organizations can inform and ask for the user’s consent.
Third party organizations do not have a direct interaction with the user, then how are
they going to inform the user and ask for his consent?
20 See e.g. Solove, supra note 13 at 1452.
21 With the concept of PII it is also included the concepts ‘‘sensitive information” and
‘‘personal information”.
22 Other technologies that help determine the geolocation of the user are Base StationData
and WIFI. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 13/2011 on
Geolocation Services on Smart Mobile Devices, 811/11/ENWP 185 (2011).
23 See e.g. Paul M Schwartz & Daniel J Solove, ‘‘The PII Problem: Privacy and a New
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information” (2011) 86 NYUL Rev 1814 at 1816:
PII is one of the most central concepts in privacy regulation. It defines the scope and boundaries
of a large range of privacy statutes and regulations . . . These laws all share the same basic
assumption-that in the absence of PII, there is no privacy harm. Thus, privacy regulation focuses
on the collection, use, and disclosure of PII, and leaves non-PII unregulated.
24 For example there is not one clear definition of what personal information is. According
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The second problem, and the main reason why this solution is not enough to
protect privacy, is that technology has made it possible to combine data to reveal
more information. In other words, ‘‘[t]he line between PII and non-PII is not
fixed, but depends upon technology.”25 Several studies have shown how
information that is classified as non-PII in combination with more data allows
the identification and disclosure of non-public information of the data subject.
For example, the combination of ZIP, birth date, and sex can uniquely identify
87% of the U.S. population;26 an analysis of the movie viewing history and
movie ratings of a person, can reveal non-public sensitive information such as
religion, sexual preferences and political views;27 and the possibility to predict the
Social Security Number of a person base on his birth date and birth location.28
(c) Collection in Databases
In this stage, the companies collect the data gathered during the tracking in
private databases. These databases contain individual files about the users of the
online platforms. Those individual files might be associated to a specific device,
or to the identity of a person (user name or real name). Current technology
makes it possible and inexpensive to store vast amounts of data for an indefinite
period. This is problematic from a privacy perspective because it creates the
possibility to have more comprehensive and unforgettable personal profiles.
With this in mind, the main concerns of this stage are the time the data is stored
and the access to the database records.
To reduce the privacy threat of the information collected, it has been
established that the data must be de-identified before it is stored and shared.29
Thus, companies use different anonymization techniques to protect the privacy
of the users.30 This is not an accurate solution to privacy because, due to
to Schwartz & Solove, there are three different approaches: ‘‘tautological”, ‘‘non-
public”, and ‘‘specific-types”. See Ibid at 1828.
25 Supra note 23 at 1846.
26 See Latanya Sweeney, ‘‘Policy andLaw: Identifiability ofDe-identifiedData”,Research
Accomplishements of Latanya Sweeney, online: <www.latanyasweeney.org/work/
identifiability.html>.
27 See A. Narayanan & V. Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets
(2008), online: <www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak08netflix.pdf>
28 See Alessandro Acquisti, Ralph Gross & Stephen E. Fienberg, ‘‘Predicting Social
Security Numbers from Public Data” 106:27 Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of theUnited States ofAmerica 10975 (2009), online:<www.pnas.org/content/
106/27/10975.full.pdf>
29 See e.g. US, Federal Trade Commission,ProtectingConsumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid
Change: Recommendations For Businesses and Policymakers (2012) at 22, online:
<www.ftc.gov/reports/protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommenda-
tions-businesses-policymakers>
30 ‘‘Anonymization is a process bywhich information in a database ismanipulated tomake
it difficult to identify data subjects.” Paul Ohm, ‘‘Broken Promises of Privacy:
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technological advances and the proliferation of personal information stored in
online and offline databases, the re-identification process is possible and easy to
perform.31
(d) Aggregation of the Data: Creation of a Comprehensive Profile
In this stage, companies exchange the data collected in their private database
with other companies in order to aggregate and transform it into a
comprehensive profile. For instance, if company A has a dataset regarding the
shopping preferences of the IP 12.345.678.90 and company B has a dataset of the
movie preferences associate to that same IP, in this stage those datasets are
aggregated to create a more comprehensive profile of the IP 12.345.678.90.32
The datasets are exchanged by two processes: shared between subsidiaries of
the same company, or traded for money in different data marketplaces.33 The
problems that arise from this stage are the commercialization of the data and the
creation of comprehensive profiles. Until now, none of these problems has been
part of the regulatory discussion around online profiling.
The commercialization of the data is a problem because it leads to the
devaluation of the privacy into companies’ assets. If privacy is transformed into
companies’ assets, and that transformation is accepted, this will affect how the
courts will interpret and protect privacy in the future. This is also a problem
about the values that society and courts should preserve and protect, or in the
words of Lessig, this is a question of ‘‘how should changes in technology be
accommodated to preserve values from an earlier context in a new context?”34
Look at the following example: two strangers (X and Y) follow one person
around the city every day. X follows the individual in the zone around his work
and Y in the zone around his home. Both X and Y take notes, pictures and
videos of the individual’s activities, then they sell those records to a third person
— C. This situation is stalking and constitutes an invasion of privacy. It is
problematic not only because the person is being followed, but also because X
and Y are keeping a record of his activities (personal life), and making a profit
from that invasion to privacy. As this situation takes place in the real world,
society will likely oppose this action and courts will protect the individual’s
privacy from this type of action.
Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization” (2010) 57 UCLA L Rev 1703
at 1707.
31 See e.g. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 23 at 1846. See also Ohm, ibid at 1705.
32 See Dan Wallach, ‘‘The Technological Landscape of Comprehensive Data Collection”




33 See for example: BlueKai, ‘‘BlueKai Intro Video”, online: <http://bluekai.com/video/
>. See also Angwin, supra note 7.
34 Lessig, supra note 16 at 191.
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Online profiling practice is not different from the previous example. It is then
necessary to think what consequences does the acceptance of the
commercialization of data collected online by private companies have in the
concept of privacy in the physical world, and in the social (and legal) values
around privacy.
The other problem that arises in this stage is the creation of comprehensive
profiles. This represents an invasion to privacy because online platform users lose
the control over their personal information.35 Assuming that the consent given
by the user to a company is valid, in this stage the information that the user
agreed to share with one company, is shared with others companies. This means
that one company not only gathers the information that the user wanted to
‘‘share”, but much more.
In addition, the creation of comprehensive profiles is a constant threat to
privacy because the profiles contain enough information to individualize a
person; to know daily patterns about that person, and to make predictions about
that person. As Solove states, ‘‘[t]he data collected [by corporations] extends
beyond information about consumer’s view of the product to information about
the consumer herself, often including lifestyle details and even a full-scale
psychological profile.”36
Therefore, it is a constant threat because those profiles are stored and
available to anyone who can gain access to it (whether authorized or
unauthorized). This is problematic because not only could anyone access those
files and learn almost everything about a person, but also because the potential
uses that those profiles could have.
(e) Use of the Data: Profile Application
In this stage, different organizations use the comprehensive profiles for
different purposes, such as online advertising; target marketing; background
checking; law enforcement investigation; price targeting; personalized
promotions; statistical purposes, and in predictive profiling systems. The
comprehensive profiles contain enough information and characteristics to
make inferences about a person (or device), for example, she likes movies,
understands French, reads newspapers from Middle East countries, buys coffee
at Starbucks, and lives in Toronto.
The division of the profiles by group is a useful tool for organizations in
order to deliver marketing campaigns that are more precise. It is worth
highlighting that the content that the user accesses online is selected by the
company that provides it, as this content is chosen depending on the preferences
of the user, and the user will only see what the company thinks is more
35 In this regard Steindel affirms, ‘‘online profiling is a harmful practice precisely because it
is contrary to traditional concepts of privacy and user expectations, which both reflect
the belief that privacy includes some measure of control over personal information.”
Steindel, supra note 5 at 468.
36 Solove, supra note 13 at 1404.
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appropriate for his profile. Consequently, the classification by group limits the
options of the user .37
Another possible set of groups are people with homosexual preferences;
people with Islam interests; people with interest in arms and bombs, and
pregnant women. This set of groups might also be useful for marketing purposes.
Nevertheless, depending on the purpose that the organization wants to achieve, it
can also be used for discriminatory practices based on sexual preferences and
religious beliefs, in unfair treatment due to pregnancy, or to profile possible
terrorists.38
The problems that arise from this stage are the classification of people in
specific groups, and the uses of the profiles. As with the aggregation stage, policy
makers have not discussed these problems as the discussion has mainly focused
on the targeting advertising industry. The online profiling problem has been
defined as if the information gathered is only used by this industry.
Nevertheless, scholars have examined the problems of online profiling
beyond the advertising industry. Some of them have made some propositions to
limit the potential uses that the comprehensive profiles might have. For example,
Solove proposed to establish ‘‘meaningful limits on how data can be used —
limits that are clear rather that ambiguous and amorphous.”39
The main problem of this solution is that today’s technology makes it
possible, and easy, to access the databases where the profiles are stored by
different actors (internal and external to the companies).40 Even if there is a
regulation that prohibits certain uses, it will not persuade actors like hackers.
Therefore, it will not prevent the access and unauthorized use of the profiles.
Moreover, this type of regulation probably will not apply to government
agencies that have their own regulation, such as the NSA that, as it will be
discuss later, also have interests in these profiles.
37 See Steindel, supra note 5 at 469.
38 For example See IanKerr, ‘‘Prediction, Preemption, Presumption:ThePathofLawafter
the Computational Turn” in Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn: The
Philosophy of LawMeets the Philosophy of Technology (New York: Routledge, 2013) at
8. See also Ronald Leenes, ‘‘Do They KnowMe? Deconstructing Identifiability” (2007)
4:1&2 UOLTJ 135 at 158.
39 Solove, supra note 13 at 1461.
40 Examples of those breaches include the breach to the smartphone app Snapchat on
January 1, 2014,where the hacker accessed the list of usernames andphonenumbers, and
the breach to Boxee.tv forum accounts on April 2, 2014, where the information accessed
by the hackers included email addresses, birth dates, IP addresses,message histories, and
password changes. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, ‘‘Chronology of Data Breaches”,
online: < www.privacyrights.org/data-breach/new>. See also Dino Grandoni, ‘‘4.6
Million Snapchat Accounts Leaked After Startup Brushed Off Security Concern”, The
Huffington Post (1 January 2014), online: <www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/01/
snapchat-leak_n_4528573.html>.
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III. RETHINKING THE PROBLEM
This paper has exposed that the online profiling practice creates a constant
threat to the privacy of online platform users. Even if the user gives his consent
for the collection of the information, the commercialization of the data, the
aggregation process and the security vulnerabilities of the databases where all the
data is stored, poses a threat to the privacy of the person. All of these justify the
need for a regulatory intervention of the online profiling practice.
This section will argue that the way the problem has been defined by policy
makers is not accurate to protect the privacy of the users. Therefore, it is
necessary to redefine the problem in order to design regulations that effectively
reduce the privacy concerns of online profiling.
The objective of the current approach is to reduce the threat to privacy
created by online profiling by regulating the first three stages of the process. For
instance, inform the user about tracking technologies and the collection of
information; ask for consent; limit the type of information that is gathered, and
guarantee that the data collected is not associated to an indefinable person.
This approach has proven to be ideal to ensure the delivering of the benefits
described at the beginning of this paper to all stakeholders, including
technological commodities to users. Nevertheless, for the reasons developed in
the previous section, these regulations do not reduce the constant threat to
privacy that online profiling creates.
Re-identification methods, proliferation of personal information online and
offline, and the possibility of identifying people from non-PII data, are examples
of technological factors that policy makers must take into consideration in the
design of regulations. In addition, it is also important that they take into account
the main objective of online profiling; this is the creation of comprehensive
personal profiles. 41
According to Ohm, ‘‘the utility and privacy of data are linked, and so long as
data is useful, even in the slightest, then it is also potentially re-identifiable . . .
[a]s the utility of data increases even a little, the privacy plummets.”42 Thus, as
the data collected in the process of online profiling must be useful as to create
comprehensive profiles, the data collected will always be a threat to privacy.
Consequently, regulating online profiling by concentrating in the type of the data
collected, will never lead to the abolition of the creation of comprehensive
profiles.
Taking into account the technological factors and the online profiling
justification, no matter how the first three stages are regulated, the result is going
to be the same: the aggregation process will be performed, the comprehensives
profiles will be created, and they will be available for someone to use. In other
words, the threat to privacy will persist.
41 See e.g. Solove, supra note 13 at 1407: ‘‘[t]he effectiveness and profitability of targeted
marketing depends upon data, and the challenge is to obtain as much of it as possible.”
42 Ohm, supra note 30 at 1751.
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As explained in the previous section, a regulation limiting the uses of the
profiles is not an efficient solution to reduce the threat to privacy. A more
accurate approach is to understand that the constant threat to privacy exists due
to (1) the aggregation and commercialization of the data, (2) the creation of
comprehensive profiles, (3) the storage of those profiles in databases, and (4) the
application of those profiles. Therefore, the new regulatory proposals should
center in the aggregation stage and the storage of the information.
However, if the goal is to eliminate the threat to privacy created by online
profiling, regulating some of the stages of the practice will not be enough. As
long as companies keep tracking and aggregating the data, the threat to privacy
will persist. Therefore, there should be more efforts to find alternative business
methods to achieve a real balance between privacy, innovation and economical
growth. In order words, to eliminate the negative implications, it is necessary to
rethink the industry and business model of online profiling in order to find new
alternatives.
Lessig argues that four constraints act as regulators: law, social norms,
market, and architecture.43 Lessig’s proposals are an example that there are ways
to regulate online profiling besides regulations. Nevertheless, it is necessary that
the relevant stakeholders have incentives in order to find alternative methods or
effective regulations to address the problems raised by online profiling and
implement them.
IV. ARE THERE INCENTIVES TO REGULATE?
The four constraints exposed by Lessig also indicates that the government is
not the only actor who can regulate an issue; the private sector and the users also
have the power to regulate. Therefore, in order to regulate online profiling, it is
necessary for the intervention of the industry and, more importantly, of the
users. An additional question to ask is whether those actors have incentives to
intervene and regulate this practice. This section will analyze what are the
incentives, if any, that these groups may have to regulate the online profiling
practice to change or affect the creation of databases with comprehensive
profiles.
(a) Government
The existence of the databases created by the online profiling practice by
private sector companies is a gold mine for law enforcement and intelligence
agents. Under national security, crime prevention or crime investigation,
governments from around the globe want to have access to those databases,
and they have found the way in.44 Governments use data mining techniques to
43 See Lessig, supra note 16, c. 7.
44 Deibert argues, ‘‘[a]s more and more data is entrusted by users to third parties like
Google, governments are side-stepping transparent and accountable judicial processes
to police that data.” See Deibert, supra note 3 at 115.
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extract intelligence from vast stores of digital information.45 The existence of the
databases created through the online profiling process benefits these techniques.
As Rubinstein explains, data mining ‘‘can be viewed as a ‘back end’ use of
personal data that is already collected and resident in public and private sector
databases.”46
Furthermore, the recent Snowden revelations is proof of the interest that
government agencies have to gather information of people (online platforms
users) and that the databases created by companies through online profiling are
the perfect source to find that personal information, e.g. NSA Prism program
that tapped into user data of Apple, Google, and others.47
As those databases are of great utility for crime investigations, crime
prevention and national security, governments do not have incentives to regulate.
On the contrary, governments have incentives not to regulate and to maintain
and preserve the practice of online profiling as it is today. The creations of the
databases are a benefit for them.
(b) Industry
The personal information of online platform users is a big business. In this
business, online profiling is one of the practices used by private companies to
collect the information. This process involves the participation of many
companies.48 The collection of users’ information began as a method to
facilitate and improve commerce by improving the effectiveness of targeted
marketing. This business method helped to shape the actual architecture of the
market. Being so, the industry has the power and tools to regulate the practice;
invent new technologies; change the architecture of the technologies used in
order to make those technologies less invasive to privacy, or define a new
business method that does not depend on the collection of data and the creation
of comprehensive profiles.
Nevertheless, various industries benefit from the existence of this business
model based on online profiling practices, and these industries are growing every
day.49 Besides the benefits exposed at the beginning of this document, online
profiling represents a huge economical benefit for these companies.50
45 See Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, ‘‘Data Mining and Internet
Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches” (2008) 75:01 U
Chicago L R 261.
46 Ibid at 280.
47 Varton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, ‘‘NSA infiltrates links to Yahoo, Google data




48 See e.g Solove, supra note 13 at 1407.
49 For example, in 2010 a newspaper article report, ‘‘Tracking activity is exploding.
Researchers at AT&T Labs andWorcester Polytechnic Institute last fall found tracking
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Due to the fact that a great number of companies are involved in the online
profiling process and all of them benefit from it, industry also does not have the
incentives to regulate or change the actual practice of online profiling.
(c) Users
Online profiling jeopardizes the privacy of the users. Consequently, users
have a huge incentive to regulate this practice. Based on the regulators proposed
by Lessig, users could use privacy tools to make tracking harder, e.g. Ghostery;
use tools that improve privacy and security over the internet to make the data
collected less accurate, e.g. TOR; or change some browser habits to reduce the
amount of personal information available online, e.g. private information posted
in social networks.
Nevertheless, two facts demonstrate that for the majority of the users,
privacy is not enough incentive to do something regarding online profiling. The
first fact is that online profiling has been a public practice for a long time. For
instance, in 1999, The New York Times published an article talking about the
tracking of consumers, the collection of personal data, and the sharing of that
data between companies. 51 This newspaper article is a good example of two
things.
First, The New York Times article demonstrates that online profiling is not a
practice developed in the dark. One thing is the companies’ lack of transparency
with the user at the moment of the ‘‘contractual” agreement; another is the fact
that the practice has been public for a long time, and the majority of the users
have not changed their behaviour online.
Second, the article also argues that consumers ‘‘are willing to part with
personal information as long as they get something in return.”52 The companies
gather personal information and give something in return, e.g. free content,
promotions, and technological commodities). This statement remains true
nowadays, and helps explain why users have not done anything.
The second fact is the Snowden revelations. As noted previously, these
revelations demonstrated that, by accessing the databases of private companies,
government gathered tons of personal information about people. Nevertheless,
technology on 80% of 1,000 popular sites, up from 40% of those sites in 2005.”: see
Angwin, supra note 7.
50 MarketingCharts staff, ‘‘B2BMedia and Info Industry Revenues Up 3.4% in 2012”, (24
May 2013), online: <www.marketingcharts.com/wp/traditional/b2b-media-and-info-
industry-revenues-up-3-4-in-2012-29788/>. See also MarketingCharts staff, ‘‘Online
Ad Revenues Up 18% Y-O-Y in H1; Mobile’s Share Doubles to 15%”, (10 October
2013), online: <www.marketingcharts.com/wp/online/online-ad-revenues-up-18-y-o-
y-in-h1-mobiles-share-doubles-to-15-37306/>. See also Deibert, supra note 3 at 57.
51 Katie Hafner, ‘‘Do You Know Who’s Watching You? Do You Care?, The New York
Times (11 November 1999), online: <www.nytimes.com/1999/11/11/technology/do-
you-know-who-s-watching-you-do-you-care.html>.
52 Ibid.
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people do not seem to make the connection of the privacy threat between
government agencies, spying citizens, and private companies gathering and
storing files of personal information about their users.
All the previous information demonstrates that it might be some kind of
technological somnambulism around online profiling.53 Companies improve
technologies to give the user more innovation, and users accept that innovation
without really questioning (or understanding) what are the true consequences of
these new technologies. Then, even when privacy is a big incentive to regulate
online profiling, for now it seems to be not big enough for the users to do
something about it.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We are being stalked around the web, and our data collected has become a
profit asset for private companies and a gold mine for everyone who needs or
wants to get personal information about us. This paper has argued that in order
to reduce the privacy repercussion created by online profiling, it is necessary to
regulate the aggregation and commercialization of the all the data collected by
private companies using tracking technologies.
Second, based on the benefits that private companies and government gain
from the aggregation of the data, these stakeholders do not have any incentives
to regulate. The other relevant stakeholder are the users, taking into account that
online profiling threats the privacy that affects directly the life of users, this
group should have enough incentives to regulate online profiling. However, there
has not been any significant regulation coming from this group after at least 15
years of the existence of the practice.
The absence of regulation can be for two reasons. First, users enjoy the
benefits they receive in exchange of their information so much that they are
willing to give up their privacy. Second, users do not understand the implications
or the magnitude of what they are giving away. The most probable is the second
reason, then the only thing needed is a big event that helps users connect the dots,
for example between events such as the Snowden revelation and the
authorization they give to companies to track them through online platforms.
Finally, today we are allowing first and third parties to track our ‘‘online
habits” but as technology evolves information gatherers will be able to track
other information more closely related to our personal life. For this reason, the
ideal objective is to eliminate the threat to privacy created by online profiling. To
achieve this goal, regulating some of the stages of the practice will not be enough.
It is necessary to replace the actual business models by practices that do not
53 See LangdonWinner, TheWhale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High
Technology (The University of Chicago Press, 1989) at 10: ‘‘A more revealing notion, in
myview, is that of technological somnambulism.For the interesting puzzle in our times is
that we so willingly sleepwalk through the process of reconstituting the conditions of
human existence”.
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require or depend on the gathering, aggregating and storing of personal data. If it
is not possible to find any alternatives, then as a society we must ask if the
economical profit gained by some private companies and the technological
innovation that online profiling practice promises to achieve are more valuable
than our privacy.
84 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [15 C.J.L.T.]
